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Purchased-Materials Inventories and
Inventory Investment
Abramovitz began his investigation of purchased-materials be-
havior by adopting a preliminary hypothesis that "stocks of raw
materials generally grow and decline with manufacturing activity." L
Althoughhe recognized that movements in prices may play a role,
this hypothesis provided the principal basis for his inquiry.Pur-
chased materials were seen to move in response to changing levels of
output, but with delays occasioned. principally by lack of immediate
availability of the materials in question.The analysis based., upon
this hypothesis consisted principally of estimating the length of the
average period of delay in securing materials.This estimate was
based on a special study made during the preparation of the 1929
Census of Manufacturers, which classified materials used by manu-
facturers according to their origins.2On the basis of this study
Abramovitz concluded that "most raw .materialsstocks held by
manufacturers are likely to vary positively with a short lag" and
that total manufacturers' stocks of purchased materials might be
expected to conform closely to business cycles, "lagging 3 months or
somewhat more at turning points."Moreover, movements., in
purchased-materials inventory investment were expected to be a
lagged reflection of movements in the rate of change in output.
Evidence at hand did not permit him to estimate how long the lag
might be.He simply noted that "a lag of investment in raw ma-
terials behind the rate of change in output of even 6 months would
still leave this class of investment leading business cycle turns by
several ..months.This, of course, is presumably subject to consider-
able especially near business peaks, corresponding to the
irregularity in the timing of turns in the rate of change in output."
In an analysis of the behavior of 10 raw-materials inventory series,
however, he found support for the tentative conclusions reached in
his estimate of typical timing based on availability of materials.6
No study such as that used by Abramovitz is available for the
postwar period, and there is no basis for an accurate comparison of
Abramovltz "Inventories and Business Cycles With Special Reference to Manufacturers Inventories,"
New York, NñER 1950, p. 178.Ills definition of raw materials as "goods purchased by manufacturers
but not yet manipulated by their owners," is used in this study as a description of "purchased materials."
It should be noted that purchased materials defined in this way include not only raw or semiprooessed
materials, but also fully fabricated component parts, such as carburetors purchased by automobile manu-
facturers or small motors purchased by-the producers of electric fans.
2,Abramovitz divided these stocks Into three groups according to source.The first group included
commodities purchased from or mines in this country. The stocks which were presumed
to be available from suppliers on relatively short notice accounted for approximately two-thirds of all
purchased materials used by manufacturers In 1929. A second group, comprising about 10 percent of the
raw materials purchased by manufacturers, was composed of imports.These stocks are not easily ad-
to changes in requirements. The third group, accounting for approximately a quarter of manufac-
turers' raw materials, included products (principally agricultural) whose availability ls subject to short-
term movements that are independent of current demand. Abramovitz noted that materials In either
of these last two classes might actually be quickly available if they were storable and typically held In




27Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
postwar and interwar composition of stocks.Fortunately, however,
there is recent direct evidence relating to the availability of purchased
materials.The National Association of Purchasing Agents has pub-
lished monthly, since April 1955, statistics on purchasing leadtimes as
reported by their members.Each respondent reports monthly the
basis of its purchasing policy for principal purchased materials within
one of the following categories: Hand-to-mouth buying, 30-day
requirements, 60-day requirements, 90-day requirements, 120.-day
requirements, or more.
These NAPA statistics indicate that, in the main, purchased
materials are readily available, but to a greater or lesser degree
depending on the stage of the business cycle.This is apparent in
the following data which show the percentage of purchasing agents
reporting leadtimes of 60 'days or less for production (purchased)
materials in business cycle peak and trough months (see also chart
16):
Perceml
Peak,July 1957 1 75
Trough, April 1958 91
Peak, May 1960 79
IJunedata were used because no July data were published.
Clearly, Abramovitz' assumption that most purchased materials
are available within a relatively short span of time is valid for the
postwar period.But has this condition led to the type of inventory
and investment behavior which he concluded would be the logical
outcome of such ready availability?In the sections that follow we
shall examine the behavior of purchased-materials inventory and
inventory investment, note certain characteristics not envisioned by
Abramovitz and inquire into the reasons for the observed behavior.
BEHAVIOR OF INVENTORIES
TIMING AND CONFORMITY OF INVENTORIES: COMPARISONS WITH
SALES TURNS
The timing of purchased materials to sales turns, as shown in. table
11, varies widely from turn to turn in the individual industry series
and 'among the series at each peak and trough.Nevertheless, the
conformity to sales turns is generally high and approximately the
same for durables and nondurables industries (about 80 percent of
sales turns can be matched by inventory turns in each category).Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 29
TABLE 11.—Timing and• conformity of manufacturers' purchased-materiat& inven-
tories at sales turns
A. TIMING MEASURES'
Industry




















































































Leads, more than 3 months
Rough coincidences
Leads 3 months oriess
Legs, 3 months or less











C. SUMMARY OF CONFORMITY





































I Inventoryseries have been deflated to 1956.1957—53 turns based on undeflated data.Timing of
Inventory turns for "Korean" cycle is not shown there were only S Inventory turns that could be
matchezl with sales turns related to this episode.See table 12 for timing comparisons of Inventory turns
with "Korean" reference turns.
No sales or Inventory turns occurred.Most recent inventory turn to occur was peak In M ay 1952
associated with Korean war cycle.
3Inventoryturn occurs, but no sales turn.
Sales turn occurs but no inventory turn; preceling inventory peak was related to Korean war cycle.
Inventory peaks occurred In series as follows: Nondurable-goods Industries, November 1051; stone, clay,
glass, 1952; food and beverages, 1951; June 1952; petroleum and coal, June 1952.
Source: Based on material from Department of Commerce.
In spite of diversity, there is a well-established characteristic in the
timing of both the comprehensive and industry purchased-materials
series during the 1948—54 period: turns in these series occur earlier
relative to sales at peaks than they do at succeeding troughs.This is
true for 24 of the 26 turns in the industry series that could be matched
with a specific sales cycle, and for all turns in the deflated compre—
bensive series.30 Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
In addition, turns frequently lead at peaks, on some occasions by
very substantial intervals.Lags at troughs are sometimes quite long,
well over a year for certain of the industry series.Abramovitz made
no provision for the occurrence of substantial leads in stocks relative
to sales or output or for, substantial lags at troughs.Purchased-
materials stocks were presumed to be so clearly associated with output
that only :lags due to delays in procurement could occur.
Nevertheless, these timing characteristics find support incertain
of his prewar data.The timing for three purchased materials which
he believed behaved typically is as follows:


























Raw cotton at mills
RawsUkatmllls
































When timing comparisons are made at the 1957 peak and the 1958
trough the results are more ambiguous. The durables and nondurables
series show shorter lags at peaks than at troughs, but the total manu-
facturing series shows a 10-month lag at the peak in the sales series
and a 6-month lag at its subsequent trough.This
difference in the timing patterns of the aggregate and its two com-
ponents is due, not to differences in the timing of durables and non-
durables sales turns (which are virtually coincident), but to the fact
that the two component inventory series do not decline significantly
for a number of months following their peaks; in November 1957 they
actually show simultaneous increases sufficient to cause the aggregate
to register a peak in that month.
It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding this recent episode.
fact that the data have not been deflated and that prices did
rise slightly at this time makes it not unlikely that appropriate
deflation would have caused the series to show earlier turns at peaks.
A second source of difficulty is the unusual behavior of manufacturing
activity during this cycle.Output and sales reached peaks approxi-
mately half a year prior to the peak in general business activity, but
showed no sharp decline until the business cycle turn.Under such
conditions there was not, perhaps,the usual incentive to reduce stocks.
Nevertheless, on the basis of all the evidence, it seems to
regard as significant the tendency for purchased materials to turn
at sales peaks thantroughs.Moreover, it is apparent that
purchased materials may turn coincidentally with sales turns or even
earlier and that lags at troughs may be of considerable duration.
•As indicated above, Abramovltz worked with a limited sampleof10 commodity series in investigating
the behavior of purchased-materials stocks.Of these 10 serIes, only 8 were available in monthly or quarterly
form; only the 3 shown appeared "to be supplied to manufacturers under conditions that afford the degree of
responsiveness of supply to changes in demand that characterizes most raw materials purchased by mast-
facturers *'," ibId.,pp. 190, 393.Purchased-Ma;teria2s Inventories andInvestment 31
The 1957—58 experience does not invalidate these findings; it merely
indicates that purchased materials inventory turns may lag at sales
peaks as well as at troughs.
TIMING AND CONFORMITY OF INVENTORIES: COMPARISONS WITH
REFERENCE TURNS
Timing and conformity of. purchased-materials turns• to business
cycle turns (table 12 and chart 5). reveal tendencies similar to those
pointed out above.Purchased-materials series typically turn earlier
at business cycle peaks than at troughs.Among the industry series
this eaclier timing is manifested in leads or roughly coincident timing
at peaks, and in' lags at troughs.Thirteen peaks could be matched
with business cycle reference peaks.Five of these turns led by more
than 3 months, seven were roughly coincident, and only one lagged
more than 3 months.(Rubber products lagged behind the reference
peak of 1948 by 8 months.)Some of the leads were quite long, as
much as 18 months.Eighteen troughs could be matched with business
cycle troughs, of which 16, lagged more than 3 months and 2 were
roughly coincident.Lags ranged from 3 to 16 months.
Using, business cycle turns as a basis for comparison, the conf ormity
rating of the durables is higher than that of nondurables.'Purchased-
materials stocks of durables show a somewhat higher conformity to
sales. turns associated with business cycle tUcfls. than, the nondurable.
In addition, the durable sales turns, conform better to
business cycles; i.e.,there are fewer "skipped" phases.The net
result is that the durables purchased materials show a slightly higher
conformity to business cycles, the four durables series matching busi-
ness cycle turns in 15 of 16 possible comparisons,.whereas nondurables
matched in only 16 of 20.32 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
TABLE 12.—Timing and conformity of purchased-materials inven-
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Leads, more than 3 months
Rough coincidences
Leads 3 months or less
Coincidences
Lags, 3 months or less













0. SUMMARY OF CONFORMITY





































Ililventory series have been deflated to 1956.1957-58 turns based on undefiated data.
'No matching Inventory turn.
Source: Based on material from Department of Commerce.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 33
CHART5
PURCHASED-MATERIALSINVENTORIES AND SALES: TOTAL MANUFACTURING,













Shaded areas represent business contractlons unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots Identify peaks and troughs of deflated inventory cycles; circles, ot undeflated cycles.All sales
data areundeflated.
Source:Department of Commerce.Data deflatedby theauthor.
When measured against Korean reference dates, turns in the corn.
prebensive as well as the industry series show very long lags at peaks,
quite in contrast to the leading tendency demonstrated at business
cycle peaks.It should be noted that the Korean cycle wasuniquein
that manufacturers reported exceptionally high levels of order back-
logs at the beginning of 1951 and that there was a marked difference
in the behavior of durables and nondurables.These matters will be
discussed in a subsequent section.34 Postwar Cycles in Man'u.facturers' Inventories
BEHAVIOR OF INVENTORY INVESTMENT
The total manufacturers' purchased-materials investment series
shows four movements from 1945 to 1954, two occurring in
the course of each business cycle.(See Chart 6.)In each pair of
investment cycles the first is the major movement.The second in-
volves a relatively small increase prior to the sharp declines in both
inventory investment and inventories proper which conform closely
to the two business cycle recessions.
Differences between the behavior of durables and nondurables oc-
curred during these two• secondary movements.For the durables
series, there was no significant resurgence of inventory investment
immediately following the major movement which reached its peak
in the third quarter of 1946, but there was a well-developed upswing
(reaching its peak in the second quarter of 1953) following the major
investment movement of 1949—50.On the other hand, the non-
durables showed a much stronger investment cycle following the
initial major postwar cycle, but no cyclical movement following the
period of intensive inventory accumulation which reached its maxi-
mum level in the final quarter of 1950.
TIMING AND OF INVESTMENT: COMPARISONS WITH SALES
TURNS
The timing and conformity analysis presented in table 13 for the
comprehensive and industry series not only substantiates the preced-
ing observations but provides detail on the essential timing
characteristics and relative cyclical sensitivity of the durables and
nondurables series.
Among the clurables, two of the four industry series (machinery
and transportation equipment). showed inventory investment ex-
pansion movements in 1948, which were merely declines in the rates
of disinvestment, but all showed investment expansions conforming
to the final stage of sales expansions that culminated in 1953.Among
the nondurables the tendency was clearly different: all industry series
showed inventory investment cycles in 1948', but none (except the
rubber-goods series) conformed to sales movements in the latter half
of the succeeding expansion.
TABLE 13.— Timing and conformity of manufacturers' purchased-materials inventory
investment to sales turns
A. TIMING MEASURES I
Industry

























































































See footnotes at end of table, p. 35.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 35
TABLE 13.—Timing and conformity of manufacturers' purchased-materials inventory
investment to sales turns—Continued
B. SUMMARY OF TIMING AND CONFORMITY
Timing and conformity comparisons
.


















Matching inventory investment turns
Percentage of matching turns
more than 3 months
Rough coincidences..
Leads, 3 months or loss
Coincidences
Lags, 3 months or less





































Inventory Investment series have been deflated to 1956; 1957-58 turns based on undeflateci data.
2InventoryInvestment turn occurs, but there is no sales turn.
3Noturn occurs in either sales or Inventory investment.
4Peakwas submerged—a decline in disinvestment.
Sales turn occurs but no matching inventory investment turn.
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PURCHASED-MATERIALS INVENTORY INVESTMENT, NEW









Change in average monthly index of
industrial production (1947-49=100)
to
See chart notes on p. 37.CliART 6—Continued
All new
Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment.37
C.Nondurable—goods Industries
194647 48'49'50 '51'52'53'54'55'56'57'58
Shaded areas represent business contractIons; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots Identify peaks and troughs of deflated Investment cycles; circles, of undeflated cycles.
orders data are undefiated.
Source: Investment and new orders data from Department of Commerce. Data deflated by the author,
Industrial production series from Federal Reserve Board.
In general, conformity was higher among the durables: All 20 sales
turns were matched by stock turns, whereas among the nondurables
only 17 of the 22 sales turns could be matched.Moreover, the
tendency to lead was much better established for durables than for
nondurables.Only 2 of the 16 turns in the durables series which
occurred at major sales turns (turns associated with business cycle
turns) show a lag, whereas among the nondurables a lag appears in
7 of the 14 turns.
TIMING AND CONFORMITY OF INVESTMENT COMPARISONS WITH
REFERENCE TURNS
Comparison of inventory investment movements to business cycle
turns provides additional evidence that this investment is sensitive
to business cycle influences and, further, that the durables group is
significantly more sensitive to these forces than the nondurables.38 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
Turns in purchased-materials inventory proper could be matched
with reference turns(includingthe Korean subcycle reference turns)
in 40 of 54 possible comparisons (table 12).Table 14 shows that
inventory investment turns could be matched in 44 of the 54
comparisons.
The durables show a perfect conformity score (inventory invest-
ment turns could be matched in each of the 24 comparisons).The
nondurables could be matched in only 20 of 30 possible comparisons.
Further, as wastruein the comparisons with sales turns, the durables
inventory investment showed a stronger tendency to lead: 15 of the
16 durables investment turns matched with business cycle reference
turns led or turned roughly, coincidently, 10 of the 14 nondurables
investment turns matched in the same way showed similar timing.
TABLE 14.—Timing and conformity of manufacturers' purchased-materials inventory
investment at reference turns



















Business cycle Korean cycle Business cycles
B. SUMMARY OF TIMING AND
Tinilng and conformity comparisons
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Leads more than 3 months
Rough coincIdences:
Leads, 3 months or less
Coincidences
Lags, 3 months or less




































• I Inventoryseries have been deflated to 1956.1957—58 turns based on undeflated data.
2No matching inventory Investment turn.
This turn cannot be marked because data begin In early 1948. The data show, however, that there was
a well-defined peak at least 6 months prior to reference peak.
4Peakwas "submerged"—a decline in disinvestment.
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CONFORMITYPurcha$ed-Materials Inventories and Investment 39
CYCLICAL AMPLITUDE OF INVENTORY INVESTMENT
In addition to their higher conformity to business cycles, the
durablesseries also move with greater amplitude than the nondurables.
This characteristic is clearly shown for inventory investment in table
15.When measured in relative terms, amplitude of total change
(peak to trough or trough to peak) is found to be larger for durables
in every phase.Relative changes computed on a per-month basis
alter the results in only one phase: the abrupt contraction in non-
durables from the second to the fourth quarters of 1948 is larger than
for durables.
Purchased-materials stocks in durables industries are
smaller than in nondurables, averaging around 40 percent of
purchased materials for the period as a whole, and this serves to reduce
somewhat the cyclical impact of the sensitive durables inventory
investment movements. When the magnitude of change in durables
and nondurables inventory investment is measured in dollars rather
than relative to inventory levels (table 15), the latter half of 1948 is
once again the only phase in which the contraction in nondurables
inventory investment is found to be larger than in durables,



















































































































I Expressedas percentage of the mean level of inventories during the Mean level Is an average of
the beginning and ending Inventory Levels of the terminal quarters of the phase.
3Topermit comparisLon with change in durable goods, purchased-materials Investment, change in non-
durable goods has been measured from the second quarter of 1053 to the first quarter of 1954.
3All1948—54 data have been deflated (1947 dollars).Measures for the two most recent phases are based on
undefiated (book value) data.
Source: Based on Department of Commerce data.40 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
TIMING AND CONFORMITY OF INVESTMENT: COMPARISONS WITH RATES
OF CHANGE IN OUTPUT
Abramovitz' analysis led him to expect that rates of change in
purchased materials would lag beh.ind rates of change in output.
Timing analysis of the postwar data tends to bear out this expecta-
tion.In table 16 all turns in rates of change in output for total
manufactures and for durables manufacturers could be matched by
turns in purchased-materials investment, typically with a lag of
investment behind output.Timing was irregular, however, especially
for the nondurables category.It ranged from coincident to a 12-
month lag for total manufaéturers, from a 3-to 9-month lag for durables,
and from a 6-month lead to a 24-month lag for nondurables.The
industry series shows the relationship to be closest where expected,
among the durables (particularly the total machinery series), and
to be poor or nonexistent among the five nondurable series.
The latter, by the nature of conditions under which materials are
procured, would not be expected to show a close timing relation
between rates of change in output and inventory investment.On
the other hand, some of the lags are much too long to be explained
in terms of delays in procurement and, for some of the series, irregu-
larities in timing would seem to be too great to find a place in the
theory.Also there arc leads in the investment turns whic.h are
contradictory to Abramovitz' hypothesis.
FACTORS INFLUENCING BEHAVIOR OF PURCHASED MATERIALS
Thus far we have seen that Abrarnovitz' theory, although it goes
far to explain the general behavior of purchased-materials inventories
and investment, does not provide for the occurrence of certain ob-
served timing relative to turns in sales, the business cycle as a whole,
and rates of change in output.
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I UndeflatedInvestment data used for 1956-58.Months in phase computed after adjustment for average
timing.
'No timing comparisons were possible.
SDatalacked sufficient comparability for computation.
Source: Inventory investment Computations based on material from Department of Commerce deflated
by the author; output computations based on Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production
(Manufacturing). Food and beverages and petroleum and coal industries because no timing
comparisons were possible.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 41
Wemay now ask if there are not other significant factors omitted
by Abramovitz.Victor Zarnowitz has established that the durable-
goods industries produce principally to order and that backlogs of
unfilled orders vary in size in the course of the business cycle.7
addition, the National Association of Purchasing Agents data show
that "lead times" for procurement of materials vary cyclically.
Abramovitz' contention that inventory objectic-es are related to
output levels makes no provision for the possible effect that changes
in the size of unfilled order backlogs have upon the willingness of
selling firms to hold purchased materials.Neither does his theory
provide for the impact of altered conditions of availability upon the
desired inventory levels of purchasing firms.
It is reasonable to suppose that both these phenomena are impor-
tant.The necessity of carrying stocks arises principally from the
need to avoid the peualties suffered when interruptions occur iii pro-
duction or in the delivery of merchandise by a firm to its customers.
Production stoppages, slowdowns, or the inability to supply merchan-
dise in the required type or amount within a time period considered
convenient and reasonable by the purchaser entail additional pro-
duction costs and result in lost sales.They may also damage cus-
tomer relations thereby reducing the market share of the firm.Con-
sequently, management acts to avoid such risks by carrying stocks in
a quantity adequate to provide sufficient pro Lection against delays in
delivery by suppliers as well as protection against increases in its own
sales requirements.Just what constitutes "sufficient" protection is
a matter for individual managers to decide.There are costs and
risks incident to carrying additional stocks (e.g., costs of storage and
insurance, risk of obsolescence, and adverse price movements) which
must be set against the protection they provide.On the basis of all
these factors, it would be logical to assume that increased backlogs of
unfilled orders (or other assurances of steady or rising future output)
or deteriorating availability of materials add to the desirability of
carrying additional purchased materials stocks and that decreased
backlogs or increased availability reduce the need for stocks.
In the sections which follow these two factors, the level of unfilled
orders and availability of materials, along with a third—price move-
ments—aré considered in detail.
UNFILLED ORDER BACKLOGS
Zarnowitz has noted that unfilled orders typically lead at peaks in
activity, but turn roughly coincidently with activity troughs.8
After a major trading movement the large backlog of orders which
will have accumulated can provide the basis for expanding shipments
for some months, even while the backlog is declining.On the other
hand, such a lead is not likely to occur during the latter part of a
recession, since any increase would immediately tend to increase the
level of production and, where inventories of finished stocks are held
or the period of production is short, the level of shipments.
It follows that during late expansion, declining backlogs of orders
constitute an invitation to trim any purchased-materials stocks that
7VIctorZarnowltz, 'The Timing of Mirnufacturers' Orders During Business Cycles,"Business Cycle
Indicators, Geoffrey IL Moore, editor, Princeton for NBER, 1981, vol. I, pp.426,451.
BIbid.,p. 451.42 Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
may have accumulated excessively during the preceding speculative
period.Of course, deelming order backlogs seldom signal the oncom-
mg recession as clearly as they may appear in retrospect to have done,
but they serve at least to put the manufacturer on his guard.Once
made, the decision to curtail stocks is implemented with relative ease.
Existmg purchase orders may be canceled or, more probably, delivery
postponed.Seen.m this light changing levels of unfilled orders appear
as a reasonable explanation of the observed early turns in purchased-
materials stocks at business cycle peaks.
In late recession, however, there will be no comparable influence to
exert pressure for larger stocks.Although new orders may turn up
before the end of the recession phase, there will be little incentive to
press for a higher level of purchased-material stocks until unfilled
orders have begun to accuitiulate.'When the decision to add to
stocks is finally made, there still remains the delay occasioned by
processing the orders and making delivery.
Although these observations may account for the observed lagging
tendency of purchased-materials stock turns at troughs, theynot
explain the duration of some of these This may occur for any,
or all, of the following reasons.(1) Since postwar recessions have
been a year or less in duration the reduction of stocks which were
at excessive levels during expansion may not have been completed.
(2) Themanufacturermay be expected to be less aggressive in raising
purchased-materials stock levels in early expansion than he is in
lowering these stocks in early contraction, since he is not under the
same pressure to do so.The beginning of recession is accompanied
by demands to conserve working capital, by a rapid increase in avail-
ability of goods (this point is discussed at length below), and by
expectations of more favorable terms of purchase.In the early
months after the trough, however, the manufacturer has no assurance
that the incipient recovery will not collapse; prices are not as yet
firming appreciably, and materials can still be procured with relatively
little delay.(3) The manufacturer may fail to foresee the extent of
the pickup as he places his purchase order and an undesired liquida-
tion of inventories occurs; for this reason he underestimates.There
is no evidence to indicate which of these is most important, but it is
not unreasonable to suppose that all have played a part.
It will be observed in chart 7 that upward movements in pur-
chased-materials inventory investment are substantial only when the
increases in new orders are sufficiently in excess of the increases in
shipments to bring about rapid accumulations of order backlogs, or
when large order backlogs, are not reduced by current
shipments at the time that a new surge in orders occurs.This general-
ization sheds light on the great bulge in total purchased-materials
investment which occurred in 1946 and the small amplitude (relative
to the very large increases in new business) of the second investment
cycle which immediately preceded the 1948—49 recession.Similarly,
it is helpful in explaining the huge movement in purchased-materials
investment in 1950 and the relatively small movement which occurred
just prior to the business cycle peak of August 1953.In each of these
cases the major movements occurred under conditions of large and
rising backlogs.The succeeding smaller movements, however, oc-
curred under conditions of declining backlogs even though the upward
movements of new orders were quite sizable.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 43
CHART 7
MANUFACTURERS'UNFILLED ORDERS, RATIOS OF UNFILLED ORDERS TO SALES,
NEW ORDERS, AND PURCHASED-MATERIALS INVESTMENT, 1946—58
A.Total Manufacturing
I 946
a Ratiocomputed for midmonth iiiquarter.
See chartnoteson p. 45.44 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
CHART 7—Continued
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• Ratio computed for mldmonth in quarter.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of deflated Investment cycles; circles, of undeflated cycles.
data are undeflated.
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All other46 Postwar Cijcles in Manufacturers' Inventories
In addition, an explanation is provided for the previously observed
differences in the behavior of durables and nondurables purchased-
materials investment preceding the business cycle peaks of 1948. and
1953.It will be recalled that in the former of these two episodes,
durables purchased-materials stocks were declining for months prior
to the peak in shipments, with an mventory cycle evident after mid-
1947 only in the rate at which disinvestment occurred; but non-
durables showed a well-developed second postwar cycle in purchased-
materials investment from third quarter 1947 to fourth quarter 1948.
In 1952—53, the opposite was the case; nondurables declined after
fourth quarter 1950, with only smallirregular movements in inventory
investment noted, whereas durables displayed a well-established cycle
from second quarter 1952 to fourth quarter 1953.
The explanation is to be found in the differences in order backlogs
during these two periods (chart 7).In the months immediately
following the war, clurables and nondurables experienced sharp in-
creases in orders which were sufficient to carry unfilled orders to record
peacetime heights.Under these conditions manufacturers increased
their stocks of purchased materials sharply.Following this initial
wave- of demand there was a second wave (i.e., expansion of new
orders) which occurred in both durables and nondurables (chart 6),
but with quite dissimilar developments.In the nondurables the
resurgence in demand in the last half of 1947 resulted in a sustained
level of unfilled orders at close to record heights through the first
quarter of 1948 (chart 7) and was the occasion for a second invest-
ment cycle in purchased materials.9In the durables, the second
wave of demand which began in late 1947 and continued through
most of 1948, though relatively much more substantial than that in
nondu.rables, was easily accommodated as manufacturers reconverted
from wartime operation.The resultisstriking: durables unfilled
orders fell almost continuously from the beginning of 1947 until the
end of the recession, and there was only a submerged second cycle in
the deflated purchased-materials investment series.
Beginning in 1949, both categories experienced upward movements
continuing through the two great surges in buying in the third quarter
of 1950 and first quarter of 1951, prompted by the Korean war; but
after early 1951, movements in the two categories were dissimilar.
When it was discovered that there were not to be important consumer
shortages, the demand for a variety of nondurables and a
well-defined recession in the related nondurables industries occurred.
New orders fell sharply until 1951, when sales reached a trough.
The recovery from this recession, which reached a peak in 1953, was
comparable in. amplitude of movement to that of 1947—48.The
volume of goods demanded was not sufficient, however, to increase
the level of unfilled orders, and sales which had been sustained pre-
viously by order backlogs gradually declined in spite of the increase
in the volume of new business.Under these conditions deflated
purchased. materials, investment declined throughout the latter part
of the business cycle expansion.
In the durables category, defense orders sustained shipments and
output to the degree that no well-marked recession developed, although
there was a sharp downward movement in new orders froth first to
It will be noted that a peak in unafled orders wa8 reached In November 1947, but order backlogs fell
very little until after 1948.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 47
thirdquarter 1951.The backlog of unfilled orders rose continuously
until September 1952 and remained at approximately this level until
April 1953.Under these conditions the upsurge in new orders which
lasted until May 1953 brought a concomitant increase in purchased-
materials investment.
The relation between the level of unfilled orders and the vigor of
inventory investment suggests that the capacity level may play a
significant role in inventory investment and in the strength of recovery
movements in the manufacturing sector.During a period charac-
terized by extensive industrial overcapacity it is not to be expected
that there will be a substantial accumulation of unfilled orders.'°
Under such conditions firms would tend to refrain from any substantial
purchased-materials investment.This attitude, if generalized, would
work significantly against the development of a full-fledged recovery.
MTAILABIL1TYOFMATERIALS
Fortunately, there are data on cyclical variations in availability of
materials used by. industrial firms.These data are found in vendor
performance statistics collected by the Purchasing Agents Association
of Chicago, and in quarter-to-quarter changes in total manufacturers'
unfilled orders (Department of Commerce).
The vendor performance series is derived from monthly reports,
submitted by member agents, in which each respondent states whether
vendors' deliveries are slower, about the same, or faster than in the
preceding month.'1These reports have been consolidated into a diffu-
sion index by combining for each month the percentage of agents
reporting increased delays in delivery with one-half of the percentage
reporting no change.
The index presumably records the approximate rate of change in
availability When the value of the index is greater than
50, a rising series indicates that availability of materials is declining
at an accelerating rate and a declining series indicates continued
deterioration, but at a decreasing rate.Conversely, when the index
value is less than 50, a declining series indicates accelerated improve-
ment in supply conditions, and a rising series, that the rate of improve-
ment is slackening.
The series for manufacturers' unfilled orders provides essentially the
same type of information.Unfilled orders are the accumulated cliff er-
ence between new orders received (less cancellations) and shipments.
In a given period, the change in the level of unfilled orders will be the
difference between the volume of received orders and the volume of
shipments.If orders exceed shipments, unfilled orders will rise, and
the larger backlog of unfilled orders will often make it necessary for the
firm to quote longer delays to its customers.If, on the other hand,
the firm is able to reduce the backlog, it may be able to reduce delays
in delivery.
Accordingly, the rates of change in unfilled orders should provide a
measure of the acceleration of deterioration, or of improvement in
loAn upward movement in orders would result in some accumulation of unfilled order backlogs because
there is a necessary period which must elapse in the production process.This period prevents the outflow
(shipments) from equaling the Inflow (orders) as long as the inflow Is rising. The unfilled orders which
thus accumulate, however, are likely to be quite small in comparison to the backlogs which would arise
with similar demand conditions and significant constraints upon increases in output.
UThisseries should not be regarded as merely an index otregional supply conditions, for firms In the hlghlp
diversified Chicago Industrial area purchase from suppliers located throughout the United Btates.48 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
supply conditions, in the same manner as does the vendor performance
series.Such differences between the behavior of the two series as may
appear, should stem from the difference in coverage,'2 or from the
fact that one is a value series, and thus affected by price changes,
whereas the other is a diffusion index unaffected by price.
It is interesting that these are the same unfilled orders data which
were examined in relation to the inventory objectives of selling firms.
But the logic is apparent: high or rising unfilled order backlogs bring
assurance of a high level of operation to the seller, but to the buyer
they bring delays in delivery and problems of procurement.As a
result, both seller and buyer find justification for high levels of pur-
chased-materials stocks.The converse holds for low or rapidly
falling backlogs.
When the vendor performance and unlilled orders series are com-
pared they are found to move in a similar manner.The troughs asso-
ciated with the three business cycle recessions are coincident on two
occasions and differ by only 3 months on the other.The major peaks
in each of the 1950—51 and 1955 series are 6 months apart on one oc-
casion, and 3 months on the other (chart 8 and table 17).
In addition to these major movements, the vendor performance
series records very clearly two brief upswings, one beginning in 1947,
the other beginning in 1952.Those movements are less well defined
in tbe unfilled orders series.
Another basis for comparing the series is the date at which they
fall below the zero line, indicating the beginning of overall improve-
ment in supply conditions, or rise above it, indicating the start of
overall deterioration.The two series show close timing agreement
in the dates at which supply conditions begin to become worse
(chart 8).At two of these comparisons (third quarter 1949 and
third quarter 1958), the turns are coincident; at the remaining one
(late 1954), timing varies by 3 months.In comparisons of points at
which supply conditions improve, the series agree less well.On one
occasion (late 1946—early 1947), timing varies by 6 months; in the
other comparisons, the unfilled orders series lags by 18 months
(1951—52) and by 12 months (1955—56). A possible explanation for
these substantial lags is that the total unfilled orders series, in con-
trast to the diffusion index in which each firm has equal weight,
reflects in a larger measure the sluggish movements of order backlogs
related to Government defense contracts (the extended lag following
May 1951) irnd producers' durable equipment (the lag in 1956).
12Thevendor performance series Is based upon a sample whose coverage cannot be measured precisely,
although It Is restricted to the performance of manufacturers who supply Industrial concerns. The unfilled
orders series Is well defined as to coverage but provides information on all manufacturers, regardless of








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
CHART 8
VENDOR PERFORMANCE AND CHANGE IN UNFILLED ORDERS AND RATIOS OF



















Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots Identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
Data are quarterly.For description of vendor performance series, see table 17.
orders data are end-of-quarter to end-of-quarter.Changes in unfilled orders-to-sales
puarter month to mldquarter month.
Source: Vendor performance data from Purchasing Agents Association of Chicago;
partment of Commerce.
Change In unfilled
ratios are from mid-
other data from De -
Another method by which the unfilled orders data' may be made to
reflect supply conditions is to express them as a ratio to current
shipments.Such a ratio should measure the average delay(in
months), assuming that the current rate of shipments is a reliable
measure of current ability to supply goods.
There are two possible objections to this measure, however.First,
production requires a significant interval.The current rate of
shipments is therefore influenced by previously existing demand
conditions and does not necessarily represent accurately the current
ability of manufacturers to fill orders.Second, these data measure
shipments by manufacturers who produce to stock out of finished
goods as well as by manufacturers who produce to order.Accord-
ingly, the total shipments series may be a faulty standard of current
to make shipment on order.
changes in ratios of unfilled orders to shipments
are presented in chart 8, and appropriatetiming measures in table 17.
Timing of this series is.substantially the same as that for the rates of
change in unfilled orders except in one comparison, the peak in 1956.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 51
The turns in the data proper show less close agreement, but there is
no substantial difference except at the most recent turn.
The behavior of these series demonstrates certain cyclical character-
istics which are apparent in each of the three postwar business cycles:
1. Availability of materials reaches its maximum at approximately
the trough of the business cycle and begins to deteriorate with the
beginning of recovery, or very shortly thereafter.In no instance
does either the vendor performance series or the unfilled orders rates-
of-change series rise above the zero line prior to the reference trough.
Supply conditions deterioiate at an accelerating rate during early
expansion and then at a diminishing rate.
2. By mid-expansion, supply conditions begin to improve, although
the high levels of unfilled orders in the three observed expansions attest
to delays.The improvement may proceed at varying
rates, but it is continuous throughout the latter half of the expansion.
3. In the final months of expansion and during early recession,
availability improves at an accelerating rate.The maximum rate of
improvement is attained before the end of the recession.
PRICE MOVEMENTS
Although it is not within the scope of this study to analyze the
behavior of prices, it seems reasonable to suppose that there exists a
more than incidental relationship between cyclical movements iii
prices of purchased materials and changes in the rates of their accumu-
lation.During periods of rising demand, tightening supply, and rapid
inventory accumulation, price increases are likely to occur.Under
certain conditions such price rises may, in turn, set off inventory
buying which will give rise to still further pressure upon prices;
under other conditions the interaction with mventory movements
might be expected to be small.
Recent work by Victor Zarnowitz shedsuew light on the conditions
which may cause cyclical price movements.Zarnowitz has advanced
and tested the hypothesis that "in industries in a high or sub-
stantial share of output is produced.to order, price change is a positive
function of the change in the [unfilled orderj backlog volume." 13
Hefinds, as set forth in a recent progress report, that for major
industries which have a relatively high degree of competition, high
coefficients of correlation between price change and backlog change
may be noted.But "in industries with heavily predominant elements
of imperfect competition or oligopoly the association between price
changes and backlog changes, while still positive, is rather weak."
Zarnowitz concludes that "while the response of prices is thus found
to be in the direction consistent with the hypothesis, its extent is often
small, e.g., the elasticities of price change with respect to backlog
change are mostly low (less than unity for all the major manufacturing
industries examined with the exception of textile-mill products)." 15
Thesefindings suggest two points which are relevant to the present
study: (1) For many industries, especially in the durable goods
sector where inventory investment movements are most volatile,
the influence of price changes on inventory behavior may be of rela-
°40th Annual Reportof the National Bureau of Economic Research,'Now York, 1960, pp. 40-41.
'4 IbId.
1$Ibid.52 Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
tivelylittleiiiiportance; and (2)the relationship between price
movements and changes in unified order backlogs is consistent with
and lends support to the hypothesis that the amplitude of movement
in purchased-materials inventory investment is conditioned by the
level and rate of change of unfilled orders.
The conditions of "excess demand" which, Zarnowitz finds, accom-
pany price fluctuations are the same as those which prompt a high
level of inventory accumulation, because (a) the price changes which
are observed and anticipated by purchasing firms stimulate inventory
accumulation, (b) the delivery problems which accompany such mar-
ket conditions make additional purchased-materials stocks desirable,
and (c) inventory accumulation itself influences price movements
(i.e., there is a reciprocal relationship).
INVENTORY OBJECTIVES AND THE PURCHASING PROCESS
In the foregoing section it was shown that the availability of
terialsfluctuates cyclically.The next task is to examine series which
evidence of the manner in which inventory objectives and
purchasing policy are affected.
MOVEMENTS IN NEW ORDERS AND PURCHASED-MATERIALS
IN VESTMENT
There is a strong tendency for purchased-materials investment to
move in a manner similar to new orders.For the comprehensive
data, this is evident at most turns during the Among
three of the industry series 16 one (machinery) shows similar move-
month throughout the period, a second (transportation equipment),
for part of the period, and a third (primary metals) displays a con-
siderable degree of irregularity.
It will be noted (table 18 and chart 6) that the important departures
from good conformity occurred during periods when unusual condi-
tions existed.The inventory investment series for total manufac-
tures, durables, and transportation equipment all show lags of 9 months
behind new orders at the 1952 investment troughs.This appears to
be due principally to the exceptionally large backlog of unfilled orders
among the durables which did not diminish significantly until after
mid-1952.Under these conditions purchased-materials investment
declined very sluggishly, the contraction finally terininatrng in a sharp
downward movement of both stocks and investment in the second
quarter of 1952.The abruptness of this decline may be at least par-
tially attributed to the extensive steel strike which occurred at that
time and which reduced the flow of this raw material for almost 2
months.
'°Ofthe nine Industry classifications for which stage of fabrication Inventory data are available, it was
possible to procure new orders figures for only three: primary metals, total machinery, and total transporta-
tion equipment.Purcha,sed-Materials Inventories and Investment 53
TABLB18.—Timing of purcha8ed-materials inventory investment to new orders 1
Lead(—) orlag (+) In months In zones associated with
referenceturns
Percentof
Korean war months In
Industry phase
MidMid.
1948 1949 1951 1952 1953 1954 1948 1948
peaktroughpeaktroughpeaktrough through through
Total manufacturing —a 0 —a +9 +3 0 79 76
Durable-goods Industries, total —3 0 —3 +9 -4-3 0 80 86
Nondurable-goods Industries, total....+9 —3 —3 0 +6 +3 83
Primary metals' (I) —3 —6+3 0+6 60
Machinery (including eleotrlcftl) 0 0 —3 0 —6 +3 87
Transportation equipment (Includ-
ing motor vehicles) +6 +3 0 +9+12 +3 63 (3)
1 InventoryInvestment series are quarterly data.Computations were based on undeflated Inventory
datapermit comparisons with new orders material for which no deflation was possible.As a matter of
caution a comparison was made based on deflated Inventory data. The results were approximately the
as those shown. New orders data are quarterly totals.
'This series showed 2 extra cycles not found innoworders.
Not available.
Source: Based on material from Department of Commerce.
In addition to this departure from close agreement, the transporta-
tion-equipment investment series also shows a 12-month lag behind
new orders at its last (second quarter 1953) peak.Here again the
explanation would appear to be found in the behavior of order back-
logs, for unfilled orders continued to rise in the' transportation
ment industry after they had turned down elsewhere. o
for transportation equipment turned down after the second quarter
of 1952, but remained above the level of shipments until the end of
the first quarter 1953.
Although all turns in new orders for primary metals could be
matched from 1949 on, there were two extra cycles in the investment
series with the result that overall conformity was low.The poor
conformity of the primary metals series cannot be explained on the
same grounds as given for the transportation equipment series, but
no close conformity should be expected.Producers of primary metals
utilize basic ores and other raw materials which are procured only
with considerable delay.It is not to be anticipated that investment
in these stocks will move as sensitively as the inventory investment
of machinery manufacturers, for example, whose purchased-materials
stocks drawn to a considerable degree from standardized,. readily
available metals and metal parts.
I have extended the analysis to the 1956—58 period for total manu-
facturers, total durables, and total nondurables.Chart 6 shows the
related new orders and inventory investment series moving together
in what appears to be the same close relationship noted for the earlier
period.Table 18 substantiates this: the percentages of months in
phase arc. not significantly altered by adding the data for these three
more recent cal&idar years.
But why does this close association between orders purchased-
materials investment exist?If the new orders data are looked upon
as a purchase orders series, their close relationship to purchased-54 Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
materials inventory investment are revealed:17 (a) When manufac-
turers are attempting to increase stocks at increasing rates they will
tend to increase purchase orders above previous levels; (b) when
manufacturers are attempting to decrease the rate of accumulation
of purchased stocks, but either desire or permit them to continue to
rise, they will tend to place smaller orders than previously; (c) during
periods when manufacturers are attempting to reduce stocks outright,
they will reduce their orders stifi more; and (d) when manufacturers
are allowing their stocks to continue to fall but are attempting to de-
crease the rate of liquidation they will increase thesize of their orders.
Thus it is clear that the pattern of new orders placed will be strongly
influenced by action taken to adjust inventories.Moreover, the
effect should occur in a roughly instantaneous fashion.In late ex-
pansion when manufacturers wish to reduce the rate of inventory
accumulation or decrease stocks outright, they will reduce. orders
placed and request delays of goods currently scheduled for delivery.
It may not be within the power of these ordering firms to halt immed-
iately the increase in purchased materials, for they are likely to be
committed to their suppliers for a sizable quantity of goods scheduled
for future delivery.It would be surprising, however, if they could
not sharply alter the rate oaccumulation on very short notice.
Similarly, in late recession manufacturers who wish to reduce the
rate of decline in purchased-materials stocks or to increase them out-
right will immediately increase orders.Again, the manufacturer may
tot be able, nor may he desire to halt instantaneously the direction
movement in purchased stocks, but he should be able to alter sharply
the rate of liquidation.
CYCLICAL CHANGES IN PURCHASING POLICY
The data relating to cyclical behavior of buying policy originates
in• reports to the National Association of Purchasing Agents regarding
current purchasing policy.Finns are reported as purchasing pre-
dominantly on a hand-to-mouth basis, on the basis of 30-day require-
ments, 60-day requirements, 90-day requirements, 6-month require-
ments, 1-year requirements or more. The data have been consolidated
into two categQries: percentage of firms purchasing on the basis of
current requirements (30 days or less) and percentage purchasing on
the basis of more than current requirements (60 days or more).The
latter series is presented in chart 9.
Although this time series is not long, it provides considerable
information on the cyclical variations which occur in purchasing
policy.The first data became available in January 1950, only 3
months after the reference trough in late 1949.We are able to oh.-
serve, therefore, almost the entire expansion of 1949—53, the complete
expansion of 1954—57 and the first year of the most recent expansion,
as well as the recessions of 1953—54 and .1957—58.Of particular
I?TheDepartment of Commerce new orders series concern orders received but there are two reasons why
such data may reflect new orders placed as well.(1) To the extent that the orders reported as received
ôilglnate with other firms within the same Industry they are, of course, authentic purchase orders data for
that Industry. The larger the Industry group, the more likely is this to be the case.(2) To the extent
that orders received by manufacturers give rise to purchase orders which have the same pattern of timing,
new orders received may be regarded as a proxy for purchase orders placed by reporting firms.Evidence
that firms tend to place purchase orders synchronously with the receipt of new orders has been presented
by Ruth Mack Zarnowitz. SeeRuth P. Mack, "Consumption and Business Fluctuations"
I'tew York,' 1950 and Ruth P. Mack and Victor Zarnowltz, "Causes and Consequence of Changes In Retail-
ers' Buying," American Economic Review, MarchPurchased-Materials Inventories and Investment
CHART 9
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PURCHASING POLICY, VENDOR PERFORMANCE, TOTAL MANUFACTURERS' PUR-




'Purchasing policy series is percent of purchasing agents reportIng 60 day8 or more delay In delivery.
January 1950 to April 1955 data cover all purchases; subsequent data, production materials only.
bFordescription 01serIessee table 17..
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots Identify peaks and troughs of specific
Source: Purchasing policyseriescompiled from National Association of Purchasing Agents data. Vendor
performance series compiled from Purchasing Agents Association of Chicago data.Other series compiled
from Department of Commerce data.
interest is the behavior of the purchasing-policy series in early expan-
sion and during recession.In each of the three expansions, observable
in whole or in part, the early months are characterized by very sharp
increases in the percentage of 'firms purchasing on the basis of more
than current requirements.Between January and June of 1950 (the
remainder of the year is excluded because of the crisis buying which
accompanied the outbreak of Korean hostilities) the percentage of
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In the period June 1954 to December 1955, it rose from 41 to 80 per-
cent,18 and from April 1958 to April 1959, it rose from 43 to 68 percent.
It will be noted that during the two complete expansions
observed, the percentage of firms purchasing in the 60-day-or-longer
range reached a maximum by midphase.The range of purchase
began to shorten well before the reference peak, but the sharpest drop
occurred during the period extending approximately from the reference
peak month to the date of the reference trough.In the period from
May. 1953 to May 1954, the series fell from 64 to 40 percent; and in
the period from May 1957 to February 1958, it fell from 71 to 41
percent.
Taken together the series representing purchasing policy, supply
conditions, new orders, and purchased-materials investment provide
valuable insight into the processes by which inventory objectives
fluctuate in the course of the business cycle.'9
As already observed, movements in the new-orders series appear,
to a significant extent, to reflect buyers' efforts to adjust stocks; i.e.,
a rising volume of orders would seem to reflect attempts of buyers
to decrease the rate of disinvestment in purchased goods or to increase
the rate of investment; and a declining volume of orders, attempts to
reduce .the rate of investment in purchased goods or to increase the
rate of disinvestment.Of course, the new-orders data are comprised
principally of purchases for production or for resale rather than for
inventory accumulation; in general, their rise and fall must be largely
in response to changes in final demand.Nevertheless, inventory
investment demand is superimposed upon this demand, and the data
give evidence that the former influences significantly the timing of
turns in the aggregate order series.This was inferred in the previous
section from the similarity in the timing of turns in new orders and
in purchased-materials investment.It is now supported further by
the close agreement between timing of both of these series and the
purchasing-policy series.
1$Thedata are not perfectly comparable throughout however.Prior to May 1955 agents submitted
reports in which all types of purchases were combined. May 1955 forward, reports were made on the
basis of three categories: production materials, maintenance and materials repair, and capital expenditures.
Only data covering production materials buying are shown for this latter period.
Thisdiscussion Is based on chart 9 and table 19, whIch concern vendor-performance, purchasing-policy,
orders, and purchased-materials investment series.Purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 57
TABLE19.— Timing comparisons: Vendor performance, purcha8ed-material8 invest-
ment, total manufacturer8 new orders, purchasing policy series,1946—58









































































































Sources: Vendor performance data compiled from statistics collected by Purchasing Agents Association
of Chicago; purchasing policy series compiled from data published by the National Association of Pur-
chasing Agents.Other series based on material from Department of Commerce.
In general, during periods in which total new orders are rising,
the purchasing-policy series is also rising (i.e., the typical purchase
range is lengthening), thereby indicating that the volume of orders
placed during these periods of expanding trade is rising in relation
to current operating requirements.It is at this time that realized
disinvestment is declining sharply (in the very early months of
expansion) or realized investment is rising (as the expansion pro-
gresses).
During periods in which total new orders are falling, the purchasing-
policy series, declines, -revealing that the volume of purchase orders
is fatling in relation to current operating requirementh (i.e., the
typicalpurchasing rangeis. shortening).During suchperiods
realized investment is found to be decreasing (or realized disinvest-
ment increasing)
The inference that the rise and fall in orders reflects, to a significant
degree, the efforts of firms to alter the rate of accumulation or de-
accumulation of stocks, is supported by the that orders lead
turns in business cycles.Since turns in manufacturers' shipments,
as well as turns in retailers' sales, show no similar tendency to lead
cycle turns, it may be presumed that the early turns in orders do not
reflect a reversal in end-use demand, but rather an attempt by
businessmen to adjust their stocks or their purchase
In addition, the role- played by supply conditions in cyc]ical varia-
tions in purchasing policy is an important one.To be sure, it is not
possible to distinguish' conclusively between cause and effect here:
supply conditions deteriorate because purchasing policy alters and
orders increase; purchasing policy may change and orders may increase
in turn, because supply conditions deteriorate.Yet,' the similarity
of movement in the vendor-performance and purchasing-policy series
indicates some degree of causation in the role played by supply condi-58 PostwarCycles in Manufacturers' Inventories
tions, particularly in the light of the functions exercised by purchasing
executives.20It is difficult to imagine that the changes in vendor
performance observed in the data do not prompt executives to revise
their inventory target levels.Indeed, if purchasing agents were not
influenced by such considerations, one of their major associations
would notcollect and publish the data on vendor performance exam-
ined here.
The influence of supply conditions may operate in two ways during
expansions: (1) Deterioration in supply conditions makes it more
difficult to achieve inventory objectives, so realized inventory invest-
ment will be somewhat less than that desired; and (2) deterioration in
supply conditions influences the inventory objective itself.
The second is by no means a simple concept.If it were, we might
expect to find that the purchasing range would be rising as long as
availability is deteriorating; that is, as long as the vendor-performance
series lies above the zero line.In fact, however, the turn in the pur-
chasing-policy series occurs at approximately the same time as that
in the vendor-performance rate-of-change series.
One can only speculate regarding the explanation of this intriguing
relationship.One suggestion is that purchasing agents may view the
declining rate of deterioration in vendor performance as a signal that
delivery conditions will begin to improve in the near future, and thus,
via a change in anticipations, the range of purchase is shortened.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSiONS
Although there are variations in the behavior of individual industry
series, certain characteristics of purchased-materials behavior appear
to be clearly established.Purchased-materials stocks conform well
to cyclical movements, turning earlier at sales and business cycle
peaks than at troughs.Turns in the comprehensive series tend to
coincide with business cycle peaks and lag at business cycle troughs.
This timing characteristic does not carry over to inventory in vest-
ment behavior: the comprehensive investment series show leads at
all business cycle turns.In these movements the durables series
show a higher conformity and a greater amplitude of movement.
The well-established tendency of investment turns to
lead reference turns during the• period under study is of major sig-
nificance for business cycle analysis.In late expansion the decline
in the level of inventory investment has constituted a source of de-
clining demand for the factors of production, and during late recession
the decline in the rate of disinvestment has provided a source of new.
strength. in the economy. To the extent that these observations are
typical, purchased-materials investment may be regarded as one of
those highly strategic forces which serve to turn the cyclical tide.
Abramovitz' theory does not provide for the occurrence of certain
observed timing in the inventory and investment series.Moreover,
it fails to consider the possible role of unfilled-order backlogs, avail-
ability of materials, and price behavior of purchased goods in in-
fluencing inventory behavior.In an provide a fuller expla-
nation, these influences were examined.
"Note that the twoserles are reported by different purchasing agent so that they are, at least
Independent.purchased-Materials Inventories and Investment 59
Theamplitude of movements in purchased-materials investment was
found to be related to the size and direction of movement of man-
ufacturers' unfilled-order backlogs.Series reflecting availability of
materials constructed from the vendor-performance data of the
Purchasing Agents Association of Chicago and from unified-orders
data.From the behavior of these series it was observed that—
(1)Availabilityof materials reaches its maximum at approxi-
mately the trough of the business cycle and begins to deteriorate
with the beginning of recovery, or shortly thereafter.Supply
conditions deteriorate at an accelerating rate during early expan-
sion and then at a diminishing rate.
(2) By midexpansion, supply conditions begin to improve
although there are still substantial delays in deliv&y.
(3) In the final months of expansion and during early recession
availability improves at an accelerating rate.The maximum
rate of improvement is attained before the end of the recession.
There is evidence that industrial prices move in response to the
same conditions of demand and supply that influence purchased-
materials inventory investment.it is reasonable to suppose that
theynotonly respond to such forces but also play a causal role.
However, for many industries, especially in the durable-goods sector,
the influence may be relatively small.
In a final section, the behavior of inventory objectives and pur-
chasing policy was observed in relation to the availability of materials
and realized inventory, investment.Data relating to leadtime of
purchase show that the cyclical behavior of purchasing policy is well-
developed; the series move in a manner similar to that of the series
reflecting availability of materials.Moreover, the timing of the
purchasing-policy series agrees rather closely with that of manu-
facturers' new orders and purchased-materials inventory investment.
Taken together these series tell of a sensitive process by which risin
inventory objectives and deteriorating supply conditions are matche
by rising orders and an ever-increasing rate of inventory accumulation
in the earlier stages of expansion.Reversal begins in late expansion,
but the sharpest declines in inventory objectives, orders, and realized
inventory investment, as well as the sharpest improvement in supply
conditions, occur during recession.